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Abstract
How do candidates’ status and social proximity to members of the evaluating audience inter-
act to shape recognition in peer-based evaluative settings? In this study, we shed light on
this question by adopting a mixed-method approach. We first examined field data on the
conferral of awards in a peer-based evaluative contest–“The Silver Tag”–which is one of the
most prestigious digital advertising awards contests in Norway. The field study revealed the
existence of a negative interaction between status and social proximity on the allocation of
awards. We then conducted two experiments to probe the mechanisms responsible for this
finding. In the first experiment, we replicated the main pattern observed in the field study. In
the second experiment, we showed that the interaction effect is contingent on the nature of
the evaluative setting. When audience members’ decisions were in the public domain (i.e.,
the other audience members knew them), social proximity tempered the effect of status on
candidates’ recognition, but it did not when decisions were private (i.e., the other audience
members did not know them). We conclude by discussing several implications of our study
for research on the socio-psychological processes underlying evaluative outcomes in tour-
nament rituals.
Introduction
Extensive evidence across cultural fields as diverse as academic publishing [1], wine tasting [2],
film industry [3], advertising [4], and screenwriting agencies [5] reveals the role of status as a
key driver of evaluation and choice. Prevailing explanations for the positive association
between status and evaluative outcomes posit that status serves as a source of information
about actors’ unobserved quality. In this vein, one’s relative standing in a social system [6] pos-
itively affects others’ expectations as well as behaviour toward the object of evaluation. Indeed,
high-status actors are assumed to be more competent [7] and more frequently attended to [6];
they are usually granted more recognition for their performance relative to low-status actors
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for equivalent performance [8]. By contrast, low-status actors are more likely to be devalued or
simply ignored [8, 9]. This explanation has found further support in a few recent studies–more
sensitive to the role of the evaluative context–that show how the choice of high-status actors is
also more easily defensible before other evaluators because it is based on what is publicly rec-
ognized as high quality [10–12].
Social networks are also widely regarded as important drivers of evaluative outcomes. A
rich body of empirical research–albeit perhaps not as systematic as the scholarship on status
beliefs–supports this view across different evaluative settings in both art and science. Parsons
and Shils [13] were among the first to highlight that social relationships between evaluators
and candidates may shape reward allocation decisions, and so compromise universalistic stan-
dards of evaluation. Blau [14, p. 265] referred to possible social intercourses between evalua-
tors and candidates, emphasizing how “the differentiating criterion is whether the standards
that govern people’s orientation to each other are dependent on or independent of the particu-
lar relationships that exist between them.” One of the first studies to find empirical support for
this intuition is Wenerås and Wold’s [15] analysis of the peer-review system of the Swedish
Medical Research Council. They found that postdoctoral fellowship applicants who had rela-
tionships with reviewers (e.g., they came from the same academic institution) were judged to
be more competent than those who had no such affiliation but were equally productive. Subse-
quent studies of academic settings have confirmed the existence of a positive association
between audience-candidate network proximity and favourable evaluative outcomes [16–18].
Experimental economists have offered complementary evidence in this direction. The work
by Dimant [19] on the role of social proximity in magnifying the transfer of norms among
peers, and the work by Charness et al. [20] on the role of a salient state of social identity in fos-
tering favouritism towards those of stronger social kinship, are especially relevant. Similarly,
scholars in organizational sociology have noted that the attribution of awards to creative pro-
fessionals in fields of artistic production tends to map on the connectivity between candidates
competing for recognition and members of the evaluating audience. Findings supportive of
this claim include jurors’ preferential allocation of prizes to professionals sharing their net-
works in the feature film industry [21, 22], and recent findings in the context of the advertising
industry exposing the patterning of award allocation choices along relational lines [4].
Overall, there is significant evidence showing how status and social proximity drive audi-
ences’ preferential allocation of attention and recognition across competing candidates. Not
surprisingly, two of the most widely used truisms to characterize how cultural markets channel
resources, honours, and attention to cultural producers reflect precisely the essence of these
two mechanisms: “You are as good as your last credit” and “It’s Not What You Know. It’s
Who You Know.”
Although we know a great deal about how status and social proximity contribute to produc-
ing and reproducing comparative advantages in social evaluations, we know much less about
how status and social proximity combine to produce evaluative outcomes. Social ties could
either dampen or amplify any positive effect of status on recognition. On the one hand, given
the universal nature of status-seeking [23], any positive effect the candidates’ status may have
on their recognition could be even stronger when high-status candidates have ties to members
of the evaluating audience. If recognition flows through the network [18], audience members
will extend greater deference to high-status candidates who are connected to them because of
the status boost that they themselves can indirectly enjoy via their personal affiliation to those
actors. This tendency to strive for prestigious affiliations has been described as the “basking-
in-reflected-glory effect” [24], or “basking in the reflection of a neighbor’s glory” [25], and it is
based on the way individuals extend their perceptions from one subject to another. This logic
implies that, all else being equal, the marginal effect of candidates’ status on their recognition
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will increase monotonically with their social proximity to audience members. On the other
hand, the existence of social ties between audience members and candidates could reduce the
saliency of status as a signal of the quality of candidates and their work. Status signals are most
valuable when there are no or limited alternative ways of evaluating a firm’s actual quality [6].
So, when a candidate projects information both due to her status and her direct connection to
the audience, one of those information devices may be redundant, as market participants are
likely to satisfice on collecting and processing information [26]. Consistent with this idea,
prior evidence at the organizational level of analysis has established that relationships that
firms maintain with their customers and status are substitutive drivers of market entry deci-
sions. Both types of social resources facilitate entry into a new market, but the importance of
status diminishes in the presence of market ties, which “represent a more direct mechanism
than [. . .] status to reduce market uncertainty and increase exchange value” [27, p. 467].
Hence, assuming that status serves as a quality signal, we should expect social proximity to
reduce the marginal effect of status on recognition.
Recent findings by Aadland, Cattani, and Ferriani [4] imply similar expectations but rely
on different interpretations. While providing substantial evidence supporting the general strat-
ifying effect of audience-candidate ties on candidates’ recognition, the authors also point to
the plausibility of negative returns of social proximity to recognition–particularly at high levels
of audience-candidate social proximity. The authors attribute this possibility to what they call
“intellectual distance,” a term used to indicate audience members’ attempt to project their
“interest in disinterestedness” [28, p. 112, see also pp. 87–88]. The general intuition is that the
audience-candidate proximity in the social network might give rise to morally problematic
interpretations of audience members’ true intentions and yield reputational concerns that
inhibit favourable evaluations of socially proximate candidates. Following this logic, it is then
plausible to expect audience members’ reliance on status cues to decline as social proximity
increases. If intellectual distance kicks in, in fact, the glory enjoyed by the target of deference
will deflect stigma on the evaluator. Thus, audience members might feel that at higher levels of
social proximity elevating the status of candidates could more easily backlash. Even these argu-
ments suggest a negative interaction effect between status and social ties, but rather than being
the result of substitutive dynamics, the effect here derives from self-motivated concerns. In
summary, how the status of candidates and their social proximity to audience members inter-
act in evaluative contexts is unclear due to the coexistence of alternative perspectives that indi-
cate different explanatory mechanisms. Which of these perspectives best characterizes the
interaction effect between status and social proximity on the evaluative outcomes?
Our objective in this paper is to shed light on this theoretical question. To do so, we col-
lected data on the conferral of prestigious awards to competing candidates in a peer-based
evaluative contest–“The Silver Tag”–which is one of the most prestigious digital advertising
awards contests in Norway, and examined how candidates’ status and audience-candidate
proximity in the underlying social network, and their interaction, explain award allocation
decisions. In this field study, we find a negative interaction effect between candidates’ status
and audience-candidate proximity on the conferral of awards. We offer external validity to the
field study and evidence on the mechanism responsible for the field study’s results by supple-
menting them with two experiments. The first experiment replicates the main pattern of the
effects observed in the field study, which indicates a negative interaction between status and
social proximity. The second experiment reveals how the interaction effect is contingent on
the nature of the evaluative setting. In doing so, we seek to distinguish–theoretically and
empirically–processes associated with stigmatic perceptions from alternative explanations that
imply the same empirical patterns but rely on different assumptions about the interplay
between status and social ties. We show that when the evaluation is public–and so potential
PLOS ONE Reflecting glory or deflecting stigma?
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651 September 25, 2020 3 / 29
violations of the meritocratic ideal in social evaluation are easier to detect and stigmatize, if
not punish–social proximity mitigates the effect of status on candidates’ recognition, but it
does not when those decisions are private (hence audience members do not have to discloser
and justify their decisions before the other members). We conclude by discussing the implica-
tions of this study for research on the socio-cognitive processes underlying the evaluation of
peers in ostensibly meritocratic settings and by identifying avenues for future research.
Overview of studies
To examine the interplay between status and social ties in peer-based evaluative settings, and
the socio-cognitive drivers of recognition, we used a mixed-method approach. Specifically, we
conducted one field study (Study 1) and two experiments (Study 2 and Study 3) to ensure the
internal and external validity of our studies. We conducted the field study in a setting where
status and social ties shape peer audience evaluations, but neither the status of the candidates
nor their social ties to the members of the evaluating audience were manipulated. This feature
of the field study allows us to establish whether status and social ties are additive (reinforce
each other’s effect) or substitutive (reduce the effect of one when in the presence of the other).
The two experiments further examine the interaction effect and the conditions under
which this effect is more or less likely observed. For the experimental studies, approval by the
ethics committee was not required because the data were analyzed anonymously and we did
not collect any personal identifiable information. Each participant also filled out an online
consent form and voluntarily agreed to participate. Study 2 explores the joint effect of status
and social ties on the probability of rewarding cultural works by manipulating the status of the
candidates and the social ties between the candidates and the members of the evaluating audi-
ence. Study 2 replicates the findings of the field study, though with stricter quality controls.
(One crucial strength of the experimental approach is the possibility of holding the project
quality constant. The true quality of cultural producers’ work is unobservable and difficult to
infer unequivocally even after consumption. The challenge is to adopt an approach that allows
the researcher to ascertain the presence of evaluative drivers independent of the quality of the
producers’ work. Study 3 probes the interaction effect by holding the presence of social ties
between candidates and audience members constant, and manipulating the candidates’ status
and the transparency of the evaluation process. Study 3 sheds light on the circumstances under
which the negative interaction is more or less likely to operate, offering precious insights into
the nature of the mechanism underlying what we observed in the field data.
Study 1
We examined the interplay between status and social ties in peer audience evaluations. As the
advertising industry is project-based it is not uncommon for jury members to evaluate peers
with whom they collaborated in the past.) in the Norwegian advertising industry, where it is
customary to establish excellence through awards contests [29, 30].
Interviews with key informants
We interviewed a panel of field insiders consisting of élite advertising professionals, advertis-
ing professionals struggling to make their mark, advertising awards contest jurors, and repre-
sentatives from industry associations (We gained access by first presenting our project to the
main advertising organizations in Norway: Kreativt Forum and INMA. After securing their
support, we approached a sample of agencies that varied on key dimensions of interest for our
study and asked if they were willing to participate. All agencies agreed to participate and gave
us access to key advertising professionals. Each interview lasted between twenty minutes and
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two hours. The topics covered during the interviews included collaborative practices, meaning
and relevance of awards, advertising evaluation criteria, perceptions of distance or proximity
in the social space, personal anecdotal evidence of jury decisions, and deliberation proces-
sesWe interviewed some of the interviewees several times to further probe their field experi-
ence. In total, we conducted 19 interviews and followed up with interviewees by email to
validate our interpretation of the data. None of the organizations, agencies, or professionals
received any compensation. Although these interviews did not form a representative sample of
industry participants’ opinions, a considerable range of views was expressed and noteworthy
themes emerged that enhanced our understanding of the award contests’ evaluative dynamics.
Table 1 reports descriptive data on the sampled agencies and respondents. Our industry infor-
mants suggested that professionals’ social standing in the professional status hierarchy is a sig-
nal of their (uncertain) quality. This status information, in turn, influences jury evaluations as
the following quote by a copywriter and former juror in an advertising agency illustrates:
“It’s a bit like that [well known high status creative teams] have a tendency to score incredi-
bly well on work that is really only average. And that is because you are positively biased,
because they make a lot of nice work. And you are a bit positively biased to begin with. You
really want the work they do to be of high quality. And, sure, if you come in [to an awards
contest], if you send in something from [an out of town agency] that is not highly regarded
in the industry, then you will struggle a lot.”
Our informants also knew that jury deliberations often are enveloped into “interpersonal
patterns of value commitments” that channel attention, energy, and information, while subtly
shaping attributions of ability [4, p. 893]. The following quote [4, p. 893] from an account
manager is telling:
“If two projects are equally good, then the project where project members and jurors know
each other will win [. . .] these people share the same opinion about what is “important”
and “not important,” as well as what is “right” and not “right.” They [the projects by candi-
dates previously tied to the jurors] might, therefore, score higher on the criteria valued by
the jurors who ‘administer the truth’ about what is good and not so good.”
Table 1. Descriptive data on agencies sampled for interviews.
Agency Agency size Services Digital awards Respondent’s role
Advertising 75–100 Full servicea Yes Digital advisor
Advertising 75–100 Full service Yes Copywriter; Managing director
Advertising 50–75 Full service Yes Digital advisor
Advertising 40–50 Mass communication Yes Copywriter
Advertising 10–20 Mass communication No Copywriter
Advertising 10–20 All media No Art director
Digital 20–30 Digital Yes Art director
Digital 5–10 Digital No Digital advisor
Digital 5–10 Digital Yes Digital advisor
a Full-service agencies typically offer a wide range of services such as mass communication, direct marketing, digital, design, and sometimes media brokering.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.t001
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Our informants recognized the influence of professionals’ status and ties to jury members
in shaping such jury’s evaluations of their work. However, they were also deeply aware that the
identity of the jury members is public information available to colleagues in the industry and
that the professional relationships between the jury members and the candidate producers are
relatively transparent with the other members of the industry, in particular other jury mem-
bers take part in award decisions. In this type of socio-relational context, the social ties of a
jury member with a candidate can sometimes translate into more of a liability than an advan-
tage. Our informants have stressed that susceptibility to claims against impartiality in evalua-
tions also tends to influence the results of the jury’s deliberations. An experienced jury
member suggested how voicing a genuine preference for a particular project could potentially
become a source of stigma due to prior collaborations with some project-team members [4,
p. 894]:
“It is a big problem if they [i.e., the members of the industry] come to believe you have a
vested interest. If you favour that project [. . .] you may end up in big trouble. I usually keep
quiet or alternatively try to mention what is good about other projects in such situations.”
In summary, our interviews seem to reveal a fundamental evaluative ambivalence caused by
the strong susceptibility of jurors to claims against their authenticity. Avoiding conflicts of
interest can be a matter of moral conviction or adherence to epistemic values. The composi-
tion of the jury is in the public domain; likewise, the existence of professional relationships
between jury members and candidate producers is relatively visible to other members of the
industry as professionals have a good sense of who has worked with whom. Lurking suspicions
of deliberations along these relational lines, therefore, can easily emerge and question their
moral character, even when the members of the jury sincerely approve these deliberations.
Secondary data
We investigate the interaction effect between status and social ties in peer audience evaluations
using the novel “The Silver Tag” dataset first described in Aadland [31]. The dataset includes
all projects entered into “The Silver Tag”–the monthly Norwegian digital advertising awards
contest–from May 2003 to April 2010. The data comprise a total of 1,734 distinct individuals,
350 distinct organizations, and 902 projects corresponding to 11 competitions per year and 75
contest months over the study period. The Norwegian interactive marketing interest organiza-
tion responsible for the contest, INMA, combines the contest months June and July each year
into one contest generation. Also, INMA combined March/April 2004 and August/September
2004 into two distinct contest generations. The data contain all winners, recipients of honor-
able mentions, and losers. The data also track all jury members serving on juries in “The Silver
Tag” awards contest from May 2003 to March 2010. Each jury served from May to April of the
following year during the years 2003–2006 and from April to March during the years 2006–
2010. In total, the dataset contains 7 juries, whose size over the study period varied from 4 (for
the first jury) to 11 (for the last jury) members.
Dependent variable
Following Aadland et al. [4], the dependent variable measures the bestowal of an accolade
(honourable mention or award) to projects competing in a given contest month. We coded the
dependent variable 0 if a project did not receive any accolade; 1 if a project received an hon-
ourable mention; 2 if a project reached 1st place (i.e., won the award). The dependent variable
is ordered in terms of levels, or intensity, of peer recognition.
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Independent variables
Social ties. We captured the effect of social proximity between audience members and
candidates on the likelihood of receiving an accolade by looking at the impact of direct ties.
We observed direct ties when the project and jury members had worked on the same project
(s) in the past. We calculated this variable by first generating bipartite project affiliation net-
work matrices based on the monthly digital awards contest “The Silver Tag” using Ucinet, ver-
sion 6 for Windows [32]. We created the adjacency matrices with a 24-month long moving
window that we updated monthly. Because our unit of analysis is the project, for each project
we created the variable social ties by counting only the number of jurors with direct ties to
project members [4]. We also looked at the impact of having mediated (i.e., indirect) ties to
jury members on the likelihood of being rewarded by calculating the median geodesic distance
between the project and jury members. Following Aadland et al. [33, p. 140], we first calculated
the median geodesic distance between each project member and the jury members. Consis-
tently with the six degrees of separation theory [34], we then grouped individual producers
with a degree of separation from jurors equal to or greater than 6, and assigned them the value
6. To facilitate the interpretation of the results, we measured the variable in terms of nearness
between jury members and producers by calculating the reciprocal of the median geodesic dis-
tance between each project member and the jury members. As our unit of analysis is the proj-
ect, we created the social proximity variable by taking the median of each project member’s
median distance from jury members.
Project status. We relied on network centrality to measure status in line with previous
research (for a review see [35]). We created the project status variable using Bonacich beta-
centrality [36], a measure that is commonly used to derive status ordering from relational data
[37–40]. The beta-centrality measure captures a professional’s prominence within the peer net-
work as a function of both the number and the centrality of professional peers to whom s/he is
connected. The status of these peers is, in turn, a function of the number and centrality of the
professional peers connected to them, and so on. Hence, the beta-centrality scores determine
each professional’s position within the global network’s status hierarchy. When beta is set to
zero, network centrality is akin to degree centrality, focusing only on the local structure. The
larger the value of beta, the more the centrality measure reflects the global structure. In our
analysis, we set beta to the reciprocal of the largest eigenvalue. However, even considering a
range of values for b, we found no substantial differences in the status scores. We used UCI-
NET version 6 [32] to calculate our status measure. Our project statusmeasure counts the
number of professionals in the project with a Bonacich beta-centrality above the median in the
global “The Silver Tag” network over the total number of individuals working on the same
project in a particular contest month. We calculated our centrality scores based on the same
24-month long moving affiliation network window we used for the social ties measures. We
also chose a more conservative cutoff to define high-status–i.e., values greater than .85 (for a
similar approach see [41])–which yielded very similar results.
Control variables
To rule out alternative explanations for the hypothesized relationships, we included several
control variables in our models.
Project sophistication. In “The Silver Tag,” jury members typically emphasize whether
the advertising projects competing in a given contest month use new technology. The creative
use of technology is perceived as a sign of technical sophistication and innovativeness that, in
turn, represents a sign of higher quality digital advertising projects. Accordingly, the variable
project sophistication differentiates projects based on the type of technologies that they
PLOS ONE Reflecting glory or deflecting stigma?
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651 September 25, 2020 7 / 29
employed. Following Aadland et al. [33, p. 141], “the variable counts the number of agencies
specializing in 3D-animation, film production, radio production, or back-end streaming
involved in a given project.” While not capturing directly the use of new technologies, this var-
iable identifies projects for which those technologies in principle could have (and most likely
were) employed.
Project size. We controlled for the total number of individuals on each digital advertising
project because the number of project participants serves as a proxy for larger project budgets
and more available resources to create projects of higher quality.
Conflict of interest. Jury members are not allowed to partake in the evaluation of a proj-
ect whenever they have a conflict of interest in that project. For instance, when the project and
jury members work for the same firm or jury members are involved in projects under evalua-
tion, the jury member in question has to exit the jury room when the project in question is
evaluated. Accordingly, we generated an indicator variable that is equal to 1 if one or more
project members had a colleague in the jury or a juror was a member of the project, and 0 oth-
erwise [4, 33].
Prior positive co-experience. Some jurors may have collaborated with candidates and
won with them on projects in the past. If prior candidate-juror interactions have resulted in
the achievement of a positive outcome they are likely to affect the evaluators’ disposition
toward the work of their past collaborators when the jurors in question cast their vote over the
competing candidates [4]. Previous social network research has shown how social ties can be a
source of social benefits (e.g., more favorable evaluations) or social liabilities (e.g., less favor-
able evaluations) depending on whether relationships between evaluators and candidates are
positive or negative [42]. We then identified “The Silver Tag” projects in which a current can-
didate and a juror collaborated and won the award during the prior 24 months. We created
the indicator variable prior positive co-experience, which is equal to1 if there were one or more
such instances for a given project, and 0 if there were no such instances.
Project median experience. Project members’ past experience with digital advertising
projects might account for their differential ability to contribute to the project and understand
what exactly jury members are looking for in a project. We measured project members’ past
experience by tallying the number of projects before the focal project each producer had sub-
mitted to “The Silver Tag” contest. For each project, we then calculated themedian experience
of all producers involved [4, 33].
Competitive intensity. The more projects compete for recognition in a given contest
month, the more intense the competition and the lower the likelihood that a given project will
win [4]. We controlled for competitive intensity by counting the number of projects competing
in each contest month.
Reciprocity. Reciprocity, the giving of gifts to another in return for gifts received, is also a
distance-reducing mechanism between any two parties involved in a social exchange [43]. As
Sherry [44, p. 158] observed, “The giving of gifts can be used to shape and reflect social integra-
tion (i.e., membership in a group) or social distance (i.e., relative intimacy of relationships).”
Accordingly, we created the reciprocity variable that “captures the extent to which jury mem-
bers reward projects whose members were jurors in the past and who–in that role–had
rewarded one or more of the current jury members” [4, p. 897]. For each project, the measure
counts the number of current jurors who won or received an honorable mention by project
members serving as jurors over the previous two years and whose work happened to be under
evaluation during the focal contest month.
Jury status. We measured the status of the jury by counting the number of jurors in the
jury with a Bonacich beta-centrality above the median in the global “The Silver Tag” network
over the total number of jury members in a particular contest month.
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Jury median experience. We measured jurors’ past experience by counting the number of
projects each juror had submitted to “The Silver Tag” contest before the focal month. For each
jury and contest month, we then calculated themedian experience of all jurors involved.
Method
We modelled the probability of each project receiving more favourable evaluations by the jury
members in a given contest month by using generalized linear models [45, 46]. We estimated
our models with the glm command in Stata 14, specifying the binomial family and setting the
binomial denominator equal to the number of jurors evaluating the competing projects in
each contest month [33]. We also specified the logit link and estimated our models with maxi-
mum likelihood. We clustered the standard errors on contest month to obtain robust standard
errors. For each contest month, we modelled the probability of jury members assigning an out-
come for each project of either no placement (0 points), honourable mention (1 point), or win-
ning the award (2 points).
Results and discussion
We report descriptive statistics and correlation values for our measures in Tables 2 and 3,
respectively. Since the condition number [47] for the matrix of independent variables to be
10.04 –well below the suggested threshold of 30 –multicollinearity is not likely to be an issue in
our models.
We began by estimating a model with robust standard errors in which the only predictor is
project status. The model stratifies by contest month, so each stratum corresponds to a choice
set for the jury in a particular month. In Model 1 of Table 4, the coefficient for project status is
1.062 (p<.01). We then estimated a model with social ties only. In Model 2, the coefficient for
social ties is .322 (p<.01). The pattern and significance of the two predictors remain stable
when both variables are included together (Model 3). We then proceeded to estimate the inter-
action between project status and social ties and the main effects for the interaction term com-
ponents. In Model 4, the coefficient for the project status x social ties interaction is -.420
(p<.01), while the coefficient for status is 1.189 (p<.01) and the coefficient for social ties is .503
(p<.01). The negative joint effect of status and ties suggests that jury members are less inclined
to reward high-status candidates who are socially close to them.
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Variables Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
1. Allocation of rewards .408 .631 0 2
2. Project size 7.034 3.818 1 30
3. Project sophistication .225 .559 0 5
4. Median experience project 3.751 4.149 0 30
5. Competitive intensity 15.364 5.968 3 30
6. Conflict of interest .436 .496 0 1
7. Prior positive co-experience .261 .440 0 1
8. Reciprocity .281 1.208 0 7
9. Median experience jury 5.706 3.061 .5 12
10. Jury status .439 .126 .1 .7
11. Project status .441 .402 0 1
12. Social ties 1.024 1.179 0 5
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.t002
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The next model includes our control variables (Model 5). While project size, project sophisti-
cation, competitive intensity, and reciprocity are significant and the sign of their coefficient in
the expected direction, the other controls are not statistically significant. When all these vari-
ables are controlled for (Model 6), the coefficients for project status and social ties are positive
and significant. Model 7 presents the results of the full model including the controls, the inter-
action components, and the interaction effect. The coefficient for the interaction term is -.471
(p<.01), corresponding to an odds ratio of .624 and a 37.6% decrease in the odds of gaining
recognition. The main effect coefficient for project status is 1.025 (p<.01), corresponding to an
odds ratio of 2.787, and the coefficient for the main effect of social ties is .485 (p<.01) which
corresponds to an odds ratio of 1.623. We also calculated the marginal effect of social ties for
representative values of project status to further explore their interplay. Fig 1 plots this mar-
ginal effect. The plot reveals a positive marginal effect of social ties that decreases for higher
levels of project status and eventually turns insignificant for very high levels of project status.
Similarly, Fig 2 plots the average marginal effect of project status at representative values of
social ties. As the proportion of project members with direct ties to members of the jury
increases (i.e., the value of the variable gets closer to 5), the marginal effect of project status on
receiving an honorable mention or winning (i.e., outcomes 1 and 2) decreases, suggesting that
direct ties to jury members become increasingly important in shaping their reward allocation
decisions. For values of social ties equal to or greater than 2, the marginal effect of project status
is not significant.
We also calculated the adjusted predictions for the number of social ties at representative
values of project status, holding the other variables constant at their means. Fig 3 plots the
adjusted predicted probabilities. When social ties = 5 and project status = 0, the adjusted pre-
dictive margin is 1.639 (p<.01). Conversely, when social ties = 5 and project status = 1, the
adjusted predictive margin is .493 (p<.01). The adjusted predicted probabilities suggest that
the likelihood of reward is high for projects with higher levels of social ties and low levels of
project status. The likelihood of rewarding projects with higher levels of social ties decreases
when project status increases. By contrast, when social ties = 0 and project status = 0, the
adjusted predictive margin is .171 (p<.01). When social ties = 0 and project status = 1, the
adjusted predictive margin is .462 (p<.01). The adjusted predicted probabilities suggest that
Table 3. Correlation coefficients.
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
1. Allocation of rewards 1
2. Project size .32 1
3. Project sophistication .25 .38 1
4. Median experience project .12 -.07 -.04 1
5. Competitive intensity -.21 -.06 -.01 -.00 1
6. Conflict of interest .19 .23 -.03 .22 -.09 1
7. Prior positive co-experience .19 .27 .16 .25 -.03 .55 1
8. Reciprocity .34 .18 .06 .18 -.15 .21 .22 1
9. Median experience jury .14 .21 .09 .14 -.08 .04 .10 .19 1
10. Jury status -.00 .04 .09 -.04 .18 -.04 .01 .06 .27 1
11. Project status .27 .35 .17 .29 -.05 .28 .38 .17 .03 .01 1
12. Social ties .28 .35 .15 .31 -.07 .59 .71 .23 .17 .03 .50 1
Condition number = 10.04
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.t003
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the likelihood of being rewarded is low for projects with lower levels of social ties and low levels
of project status, but that the likelihood increases slightly when project status increases.
Overall, these results identify an important boundary condition that may alter the saliency
of status cues. While social ties appear to reduce the need to rely on status-based evaluation, as
encoded in a publicly observable status hierarchy, they become less salient in driving recogni-
tion as the project members’ status increases. These results, in other words, suggest that status
Table 4. Generalized linear models (clustered on contest/month).
Variables Model 1 Coeff. Model 2 Coeff. Model 3 Coeff. Model 4 Coeff. Model 5 Coeff. Model 6 Coeff. Model 7 Coeff. Model 8 Coeff.
Project size .066��� .047�� .045�� .047��
(.015) (.017) (.016) (.015)
Project sophistication .317��� .308��� .337��� .265���
(.069) (.078) (.079) (.062)
Median experience project .028+ .007 .014 .013
(.015) (.016) (.015) (.015)
Competitive intensity -.047��� -.045��� -.044��� -.049���
(.011) (.010) (.009) (.010)
Conflict of interest .245+ .127 .049 .025
(.142) (.147) (.141) (.141)
Prior positive co-experience -.038 -.345+ -.300+ -.127
(.157) (.181) (.170) (.152)
Reciprocity .133��� .134��� .139��� .130���
(.028) (.027) (.027) (.025)
Median experience jury .005 .013 .009 .002
(.014) (.014) (.014) (.016)
Jury status -.131 -.237 -.127 .004
(.363) (.333) (.310) (.338)
Project status 1.062��� .740��� 1.189��� .546�� 1.025��� 3.115���
(.145) (.182) (.250) (.202) (.260) (.755)
Social ties .322��� .208��� .503��� .154� .485���
(.038) (.050) (.089) (.069) (.104)








Constant -3.727��� -3.582��� -3.824��� -4.066��� -3.385��� -3.506��� -3.789��� -5.639���
(.116) (.074) (.109) (.151) (.267) (.260) (.270) (.480)
N 654 654 654 654 654 654 654 654
Log pseudolikelihood -516.94 -517.81 -509.68 -505.09 -481.584 -474.14 -469.16 -463.52
AIC 1037.87 1039.61 1025.37 1018.18 983.15 972.29 964.31 953.05
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in the project and social ties are not additive, pointing instead to a substitution effect between
them.
Robustness checks. We conducted additional analyses to gauge the validity of our find-
ings. In particular, we looked at the impact of having mediated (i.e., indirect) ties to jury
Fig 1. Average marginal effects of social ties.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.g001
Fig 2. Average marginal effects of project status.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.g002
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members on the likelihood of being rewarded. We re-estimated the full model (Model 8) by
interacting the alternative measure of social proximity with the project status variable. The pat-
tern and significance levels in the model remain stable: the coefficient for the interaction term
is -10.245 (p<.01), while the main effect coefficient for project status is 3.115 (p<.01) and the
main effect coefficient for social proximity is 9.408 (p<.01). These results also confirm the exis-
tence of a substitution effect between status and social (direct and indirect) ties. We also re-
estimated the full model (Model 8) after orthogonalizing all explanatory variables and the
results were the same.
To provide an alternative control for the effect of project quality, we estimated the full
model 7 with a latent project quality variable. The construction of the latent project quality var-
iable is described in detail in [4]. The coefficient for project quality is positive, 1.336, and signif-
icant at (p<.01), while the overall pattern and significance levels remain stable. The coefficient
for the interaction term is -.423 (p<.01), the main effect coefficient for project status is .902
(p<.01) and the main effect coefficient for social ties is .449 (p<.01).
We also collapsed the levels of the dependent variable–with non-wins = 0 and recognition
(honorable mention or win) = 1 –and re-estimated the full model 7 with fixed effects condi-
tional logistic regression. The variables competitive intensity,median jury experience, and jury
status are dropped from the model due to lack of within contest month variance, but the pat-
tern and significance levels for the remaining variables in this model also remain stable. Expos-
ing the interaction effect, the coefficient for the interaction term is -.546 (p<.05), while the
main effect coefficient for project status is 1.081 (p<.01), and the main effect coefficient for
social ties is .632 (p<.01). Finally, the results were not affected when we clustered the standard
errors on firm rather than contest/month. Although the results for the last analysis are not
reported here, they are available from the authors upon request.
Fig 3. Adjusted predictions for the number of social ties at representative values of project status.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.g003
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Study 2
During our observation window, the advertising field insiders we interviewed emphasized
how projects of high quality were likely to exhibit certain measurable attributes separate from
the un-measurable idiosyncratic aspects of the creative idea underlying each project. Accord-
ingly, in the field study, we controlled for some of these project-level attributes. Yet, other
unobserved characteristics not captured in our analysis might affect jury members’ perception
of project quality, thereby affecting the chances of a project being rewarded. In Study 2, we
tried to alleviate this concern by replicating our effects in an online experimental study. By ask-
ing participants to evaluate the same advertising project–thus keeping its quality constant and
varying only descriptions of candidates’ status and their social ties to evaluators–Study 2 helps
rule out quality differences among projects as an explanation for our results. We replicated the
field study by priming all participants to think that their evaluations were in the public domain
and telling them that the jury would select the winners collectively. We developed vignettes to
describe an award contest–i.e., a fictional Digital advertising contest–in which we asked partic-
ipants to serve as jury members and bestow an award on a commercial. In the vignettes, we
employed different cues to manipulate the status level (status vs. no-status) of the commercials’
creators, and the presence of social ties (direct ties vs. no-direct ties) between them and the
experiment participants (i.e., jury members). We used award propensity as the dependent
variable.
Method
Participants. Six hundred and fourteen participants were recruited online using Ama-
zon’s Mechanical Turk. They received $1.00 for completing the study. Potential participants
were restricted only to US residents with a 95% or greater approval rating on MTurk. To
ensure that participants read and completed the questionnaire carefully, we applied two atten-
tion checks and excluded from the final analysis participants who missed the correct answers.
To check if participants really watched the commercial, we asked them “What is the commer-
cial about?” after they watched the video. Specifically, they had five options as possible answers:
Financial Service (the correct answer), Nutrition Service, Medical Service, Recycling Service or
Health Care Service. The second check was an instructional manipulation check [IMC, 48] to
ensure participants read the text: specifically, we instructed participants to leave blank the fol-
lowing question: “Do you think commercials affect your purchasing decisions? Please justify
your answer with an example.” Since we required participants to watch a commercial that
lasted 55 seconds, we removed those participants who did not watch and/or spent too much
time watching the video. We then recorded the time each participant spent on the page with
the commercial and computed the percentiles for the time variable. In the analysis, we used
the data on the participants included in the 5th and the 95th percentile–which corresponded
to 50 and 122 seconds, respectively. All these procedures are strongly recommended to ensure
the pool of subjects is of high quality and remove inattentive responses when online tools such
as Mechanical Turk are used [49–53]. The final sample consisted of 518 participants (52.5%
female,Mage = 36.53 years, 75.3% Caucasian).
Material and procedure. We randomly assigned participants to one of the four condi-
tions in a 2 (status: status vs. no-status) x 2 (social ties: direct ties vs. no-direct ties) between-
subjects experiment. Participants first read a vignette that informed them about a digital adver-
tising competition where they had to serve as jury members. Then, they were asked to assign
an award to a commercial after evaluating its aesthetic beauty and animation features. We
chose these two evaluative criteria because they represent the qualities evaluated by the jurors
in our field study. In order to replicate the evaluative process of the field study, we also
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informed the participants that “the jury selects the winner collectively thereby disclosing the
vote cast by each jury member.” The purpose of this clarification is to induce the participants
to think that they have to justify their evaluation before the other jury members. We used this
vignette to describe the evaluative setting:
Advertising digital competition
“In your community, there are many initiatives, including an annual Competition in Digital
Advertising. Everyone in the community can participate in the competition by submitting a
commercial. Each commercial is judged and has the opportunity to win an award. Since
you participated in the competition in the past, this year the organizers of the competition
have asked you to become a jury member. As a jury member, you have to assign an award
to a commercial after evaluating its aesthetic beauty and animation features.”
After reading about the evaluative setting, participants received more information concerning
the commercial’s creators (authors in the vignettes). Specifically, we described the creators of
the commercial in terms of their status and their social ties to the experimental participants.
We designed the manipulation of status by varying the creators’ prestige and expertise. This
manipulation was developed in line with the observation that expertise assessment is essen-
tially “a status-organizing process” [54, p. 561] because individuals who have higher status are
seen as more competent, whereas those who are of lower status are seen as less competent [55,
p. 216]. In sum, in the status condition, the creators of the commercials were described as
well-known experts in advertising, whereas in the no-status condition they were described as
non-experts. The social ties manipulation was designed as the presence or absence of a direct tie
to ensure consistency in the field study. Based on our manipulation, we informed the partici-
pants that they knew the commercial’s creators and had collaborated with them in the past
(i.e., direct ties condition), or that they did not know any of the commercial’s creators and had
never collaborated with them in the past (i.e., no-direct ties condition). Participants in the sta-
tus and social ties condition read the description below (if assigned to the no-status and no-
direct ties conditions, participants read the text in italics. Our scenario-based manipulations
can be seen as a form of contextual priming, in which primed knowledge works as an anchor
that is, as a standard of comparison for (re) evaluating the target, possibly resulting in contrast-
ing the target away from the prime [56]. In following this approach, we relied on prior experi-
mental studies using descriptive texts to prime status [e.g., 57, 58] or social ties [e.g., 59–61].
“In addition to the video, the organizers provide you with some information about the
authors of the commercial. Looking at this information, you realized that all the authors of
the commercial are well-known experts (non-experts) in advertising, and that you know
some (don’t know any) of them because you collaborated with them (never collaborated
with them) on commercials in the past.”
After reading the vignettes, participants in all four conditions watched and evaluated the
same commercial on a new financial service. We selected this commercial from an actual
Internet advertising contest where leading industry experts serve as judges in assigning various
awards to commercials. The commercial chosen for the experiment was recognized as the Best
Computer: Software Online Video. Link to the competition site: http://www.iacaward.org/iac/
medium/Online-Video/best-online-video.html#. Link to the commercial site: https://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=JHpVhEjufyA.
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Award propensity. Our dependent variable measures whether participants are willing to
assign an award to the commercial based on a 7-point scale (1 = “Definitely no”, 7 = “Defi-
nitely yes”; the question was the following: “Would you assign an award to the commercial?”).
Manipulation checks. We included both status and social tie’s manipulation check. For
the status manipulation check, we asked participants to answer the following question: “How
much prestige do you think the authors have in advertising?” They rated the authors’ prestige
on a 7-point scale (1 = very low prestige, 7 = very high prestige). For the social ties manipula-
tion, we asked the participant the following question: “How familiar do you feel with the
authors?” Participants reported their answer on a 7-point scale (1 = not at all familiar,
7 = extremely familiar).
Results and discussion
Pre-analysis. We first checked the presence of outliers for our dependent variable (award
propensity) and identified nine outliers based on the Z-scores threshold of 2.5 SD [53, 62]. We
removed these subjects from all subsequent analyses. We removed outliers at 2.5 SD in our
experiments to increase the power by reducing the error variance. This is also the same reason
why we removed inattentive participants by using the two attention checks and the commer-
cial watching time. As Meyvis and van Osselaer [53, p. 1161] argue, the removal of participants
“is often both legitimate and preferable. . .as this may produce both a more powerful and a
more accurate test of the hypothesis.”
Manipulation checks. First, we assessed whether the participants perceived the status
manipulation by running a 2 (status: status vs. no-status) x 2 (social ties: direct ties vs. no-
direct ties) between-subjects ANOVA on the rating of the creators’ prestige. The analysis
showed a significant main effect for status (F (1, 505) = 63.36, p<.001): participants in the sta-
tus condition rated the commercial’s creators as more ‘prestigious’ than participants in the no-
status condition (Mstatus = 4.68, SDstatus = 1.22; Mno status = 3.77, SDno status = 1.36). No other
significant effects were observed in the results. Similarly, to test the social tie manipulation, we
ran a 2 (status: status vs. no-status) x 2 (social ties: direct ties vs. no-direct ties) between-sub-
jects ANOVA on the rating of the creators’ familiarity. The analysis showed a significant main
effect for direct tie (F (1, 505) = 29.74, p<.001): participants in the direct ties condition per-
ceived the commercial’s creators as more ‘familiar’ than participants in the no-direct ties con-
dition (Mdirect ties = 2.84, SDdirect ties = 1.57; Mno-direct ties = 2.12, SDno-direct ties = 1.38). No other
significant effects were observed in the results. Thus, we concluded that the manipulations of
our two independent variables worked as expected.
Award propensity. We ran a 2 (status: status vs. no-status) x 2 (social ties: direct ties vs.
no-direct ties) between-subjects ANOVA on award propensity. Consistent with our field
study, the results showed a significant two-way interaction (F (1,505) = 11.56, p = .001). The
main effects of status and social ties were not significant. In support of this finding, simple
effects tests revealed that participants with direct ties to the commercial’s creators were less
willing to assign the commercial an award when creators with status (M = 4.37, SD = 1.15)
rather than no-status (M = 4.81, SD = 1.13; F (1,505) = 7.86, p<.01) were involved. In contrast,
participants with no direct ties to the commercial’s creators were more willing to assign the
commercial an award if status (M = 4.61, SD = 1.14) rather than no-status (M = 4.31,
SD = 1.44; F (1,505) = 3.99, p<.05) creators were involved. Fig 4 graphs the lines, Fig 5 reports
the bar charts and Table 5 reports the results.
These experimental findings corroborate the concomitant influence of status and social ties
in shaping individual evaluative outcomes, thereby substantiating our results from the field
study. The joint effect of status and ties is negative, confirming that audience members are less
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Fig 4. Study 2: The effect of status and social ties on award propensity.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.g004
Fig 5. Study 2: The effect of status and social ties on award propensity. Note: Error bars are ± 1 SE.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.g005
Table 5. Results for study 2.
Status No Status
Social Ties (A) No Ties (B) Social Ties (C) No Ties (D) Interaction F (1, 505) Simple Effects
Award Propensity
M 4.37 4.61 4.81 4.31 11.56 (p = .001) B > D (p = .046)
A < C (p = .005)
N 121 128 129 131
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.t005
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inclined to reward high-status candidates who are socially close to them. In the case of no ties,
no recognition deterrent is present and the positive effect of status on award propensity pre-
vails. Study 2 offers strong validation of the negative interaction effect because we manipulated
status and social ties holding the project’s quality constant. Doing so significantly mitigates the
possibility that project level features may account for the effects observed in Study 1. In the
Appendix, we report the results of a replication (experimental) study (i.e., Study 4) where we
use a different manipulation of status (‘famous’ and ‘not very famous’ instead of ‘well-known
expert’ and ‘non-expert’) and a different scenario describing the evaluative setting and we rep-
licate the negative interaction between status and social ties. Please, see the Appendix for the
full description and the results of this additional study.
Study 3
While Study 2 increases the internal and external validity of Study 1’s findings, it does not
allow us to isolate the precise mechanism responsible for the negative interaction. Two equally
plausible mechanisms could explain such an empirical pattern. The first is based on the under-
standing of status and social ties as substitutive judgment devices, namely the idea that social
ties may substitute for status in conveying inferential information on evaluative targets, which
in turn may guide evaluative decisions. To the extent that social ties channel private informa-
tion on the evaluation target, audience members with ties to candidates who are in the consid-
eration set should be less sensitive to status information. Conversely, the signaling effect of
status should be significantly stronger for audience members who lack such ties and thus have
no first-hand information on which to rely in their evaluation. The second explanation relies
on social pressure arguments, namely on audience members’ concern to be perceived as fair
and disinterested in their evaluation since favoring candidates that are both high status and
socially proximate to them can easily evoke suspicions of departure from the meritocratic
ideal. The reflected glory evaluators enjoy through their connection to the winner of the tour-
nament may predispose peers towards a morally problematic interpretation of those evalua-
tors’ motives. Thus, while both mechanisms could account for the same result patterning, the
underlying explanations are profoundly different. In the first case, audience members who are
socially close to the candidates arguably are less likely to use status information to reduce their
evaluative uncertainty because social ties represent a more direct mechanism to temper evalua-
tive uncertainty. In the second, audience members who are socially close to the candidates
whose work they are expected to evaluate are less sensitive to their status because any further
elevation of status of the target could exacerbate the perception that they are pursuing self-
serving interests (even when this concern entails overruling a genuine assessment of merit).
In Study 3, we seek to unravel this duality by manipulating the evaluative context. In partic-
ular, we reasoned that if the interaction effect reflects evaluators’ reputational concerns then
the outcome of the evaluation should depend significantly on whether individual choices are
private or in the public domain–and therefore subject to others’ scrutiny. Note that in the field
study the decisions of each jury member are collectively socialized and hence known to the
other jury members. While this is often the case in peer-based evaluative settings in cultural
fields (e.g., Cannes Film Festival, NSF evaluations), there are also evaluative settings in which
decision-makers remain oblivious to each other’s deliberations (e.g., Grammies, Oscars).
Study 3 reproduces the previous studies as closely as possible; however, evaluators are explicitly
told whether or not their evaluations are in the public domain (i.e., known to other evaluators).
We then varied only the description of candidates’ status, keeping constant their ties to evalua-
tors. Accordingly, we asked all the study participants to evaluate a commercial created by
peers with whom they were directly connected, and we manipulated both the status of the
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authors of the commercial and the transparency of the evaluation process–i.e., whether or not
evaluators’ decisions are openly and collectively debated. Specifically, we developed two dis-
tinct descriptions of the contest: one in which the participants are told that their vote will be
disclosed and the other in which participants are told that their vote will not be disclosed to
the other jury members–which we label public evaluation and non-public evaluation, respec-
tively. These manipulations allow us to ensure that only the participants asked to evaluate
high-status peers in the public condition might be susceptible to stigmatizing perceptions. If
the pressure to pre-empt potential reputational concerns shapes evaluative considerations,
then the propensity to reward any given commercial should decline when the (socially proxi-
mate) author of the commercial is high-status and the evaluator’s assessment is public. Stated
differently, we should expect the probability to bestow an award on status peers–as opposed to
no-status peers–to decline only when the vote is public. By contrast, when the vote is not in the
public domain, we should not expect status peers to differ from no-status peers in terms of
award propensity. If, on the contrary, status and social ties operate as substitute informational
devices, then we should expect no difference between the public and the private conditions.
Method
Participants. A sample of five hundred and twenty participants was recruited via Prolific,
an online UK-based platform [63]. The participants were compensated .70 GBP for completing
the study. The recruitment was limited only to residents in the United Kingdom. As in the
prior study, we used two attention check questions to exclude participants who did not pay
attention while taking the survey. We used the same attention check of Study 2 to ensure that
participants watched the commercial, and a similar IMC that instructed participants to leave
the text-entry space blank for the following question: “In your opinion, which are the charac-
teristics of good commercials? Please describe these characteristics below.” Since in our
vignettes we used the same commercial as in Study 1, we ensured consistency with the first
experiment by including in the analysis only the participants who watched the commercial for
more than 50 seconds and less than 122 seconds. As explained earlier, these methods are rec-
ommended to remove inattentive responses from online surveys to make sure that the pool of
subjects is of high quality. The final sample consisted of 402 participants (68.8% female,
Mage = 35.58 years, 84.8% Caucasian).
Material and procedure. We randomly assigned participants to one of the four condi-
tions in a 2 (status: status vs. no-status) x 2 (public domain: public evaluation vs. non-public
evaluation) between-subjects experiment. Participants were asked to read the same vignette
used in Study 2, except for the information concerning the evaluation’s public domain. In par-
ticular, to manipulate the public domain of the evaluation, participants in the public evaluation
condition read: “Your vote will be publicly disclosed to the other jury members to collectively
select the winner.” On the other hand, in the non-public evaluation condition, participants
read: “Your vote will not be disclosed to the other jury members to collectively select the win-
ner.” Like in Study 2, participants received specific information regarding the commercial’s
creators. In all four conditions, we held direct ties between the creators of the commercial and
the experimental participants constant by telling the participants that they knew the commer-
cial’s creators and had collaborated with them in the past. We then manipulated the status of
the creators by applying the same manipulation as in Study 2. Finally, participants were asked
to watch and evaluate the commercial already employed in Study 2.
Award propensity. The same question from Study 2 was used to measure the propensity
to award the commercial.
PLOS ONE Reflecting glory or deflecting stigma?
PLOS ONE | https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651 September 25, 2020 19 / 29
Manipulation checks. We included both status and public domain manipulation checks.
Consistently with Study 2, we used the same manipulation check for status by asking partici-
pants how much prestige they think the authors have in advertising on a 7-point scale
(1 = very low prestige, 7 = very high prestige). For the public domain’s manipulation, we asked
the participant the following question: “Do you think the award decision is anonymous?” Par-
ticipants reported an answer on a 7-point scale (1 = definitely no, 7 = definitely yes).
Results and discussion
Pre-analysis. Following the same approach of Study 2, from an analysis of outliers on our
dependent variable–award propensity–we identified five outliers based on the Z-scores thresh-
old of 2.5 SD [62, 53]. We removed these subjects from subsequent analyses.
Manipulation checks. We tested the effectiveness of the status manipulation with a 2 (sta-
tus: status vs. no-status) x 2 (public domain: public evaluation vs. non- public evaluation)
between-subjects ANOVA on the rating of the creators’ prestige. The result revealed a signifi-
cant main effect for status (F (1, 393) = 174.23, p<.001): participants in the status condition
considered the creators of the commercial more prestigious than participants in the no-status
condition (Mstatus = 5.34, SDstatus = 1.04; Mno status = 3.69, SDno status = 1.46). The analysis also
showed a significant main effect for public domain (F (1, 393) = 4.29, p = .039; Mnon-public =
4.61, SDnon-public = 1.44; Mpublic = 4.46, SDpublic = 1.57) and a marginally significant interaction
(F (1, 393) = 3.84, p = .051). Since these results suggest a potential confound in our experimen-
tal manipulation, we followed Perdue and Summers’ [64, p. 323] recommendation and com-
pared the effect sizes of each factor to check the validity of our manipulation. The effect size of
the status manipulation (η2status = .307) was 28 times greater than the effect size of the public
domain’s manipulation (η2public domain = .011) and 31 times greater than the effect size of the
interaction effect (η2intercation = .01), suggesting that our status manipulation worked as
expected. To test the public domain’s manipulation, we ran a 2 x 2 ANOVA on a decision’s
anonymity. The analysis showed a significant main effect for public domain (F (1, 393) =
389.71, p<.001): participants in the non-public condition perceived the decision to be anony-
mous compared to the public condition (Mnon-public = 5.28, SDnon-public = 1.54; Mpublic = 2.28,
SDpublic = 1.48). We found no other significant effects on the results. Thus, our public domain’s
manipulation was effective.
Award propensity. A two-way ANOVA on award propensity revealed no significant
main effect for status (F (1, 393) = 2.24, p>.05), public domain (F (1, 393) = .024, p>.05.), and
the interaction (F (1, 393) = 1.75, p>.05). Yet, more importantly, the results of planned con-
trasts analysis showed the expected pattern. Meyvis and van Osselaer [53] argue that “requiring
authors to demonstrate a reliable main effect before allowing the testing of planned contrasts
(which more precisely test the hypothesis) is not a statistically sound argument” [53, pp. 1171–
1172]. Also, Keppel and Wickens [65] state that “when an experiment has been designed to
investigate a particular planned contrast, it should be tested regardless of the significance of
the omnibus F statistics” [65, p. 116]. Since we did not expect some of the experimental condi-
tions to differ from each other, the planned contrasts analysis is more precise and powerful
than the omnibus F test.
First, we examined the effect by comparing the “status and public condition” vs. the “no sta-
tus and public condition.” As expected, the planned contrast revealed that participants were
less likely to assign an award to a commercial created by status peers (Mstatus and public = 4.25,
SDstatus and public = 1.17) compared to a commercial created by no status peers when their vote
was public (Mno status and public = 4.58, SDno status and public = 1.12; t (393) = -2.00, p<.05). To test
the other planned contrast, we compared the “status and non-public condition” to the “no
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status and non-public condition.” As expected, this contrast was not significant, t (393) = -.12,
p>.05 (Mstatus and non-public = 4.42, SDstatus and non-public = 1.17, Mno status and non-public = 4.44,
SDno status and non-public = 1.14). Overall, the contrast tests confirmed previous findings, further
supporting our speculation that a stigma deflection effect is at play because a commercial’s
likelihood to receive an award declined significantly only when jurors evaluated the work of
status peers directly connected to them and their vote was public. We observed no such effect
when the evaluation occurred privately. Although we cannot conclusively rule out the alterna-
tive explanation that status and social (ties) information operate as substitutive information
devices, we believe that this alternative explanation is unlikely to affect the results. Fig 6 graphs
the lines, Fig 7 reports the bar charts and Table 6 reports the results.
Fig 6. Study 3: The effect of status and public domain on award propensity.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.g006
Fig 7. Study 3: The effect of status and public domain on award propensity. Note: Error bars are ± 1 SE.
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.g007
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Discussion and conclusions
In the sociological and organizational literature, tournament rituals operate by selectively allo-
cating recognition among competing candidates [66, 67]. Well-known examples of ceremonies
in the cultural domain that signal creative achievement epitomizing peer-based recognition
are the Academy Awards in motion picture [68], the Grammies in music [67], the John Bates
Clark Medal in economics [69], the Nobel Prize for advances in culture and science [70], and
so on. Operating as markers of distinction, these ceremonies shape a cultural field’s status
ordering [71]. As such, they have received significant attention from scholars interested in
understanding the socio-cognitive mechanisms underlying these evaluative efforts [72–74, 21,
75, 25]. Prior research, therefore, has shown how status and social networks are pervasive
forces that produce and reproduce attributions of distinction in artistic and scientific evalua-
tive settings. Although several studies have documented the importance of status or social net-
works across a variety of domains of cultural production, very limited research has focused on
how the two mechanisms operate in tandem to shape evaluative outcomes.
We argued that proximity in the social network could moderate the almost universal associ-
ation between status and recognition. Specifically, social ties to members of the evaluating
audience could increase or decrease the positive effect of the candidate’s status. In a field study
of award conferrals in advertising contests, we found social proximity between advertising
professionals and jury members to attenuate the positive association between status and recog-
nition. Conversely, social ties between audience members and candidates were particularly
beneficial in fostering the recognition of candidates who lacked status credentials. Supplemen-
tary online experiments aimed at further corroborating this finding and clarifying the underly-
ing mechanism confirmed the negative interaction effect. It is indeed reassuring that we
observe the same pattern of effects in the real world (Study 1) and in the online experiments
(Studies 2 and 3), which supports the internal and external validity of our results–an important
criterion for impactful research in the social sciences [76].
However, Studies 1 and 2 cannot distinguish between two slightly different mechanisms
that could underlie the negative interaction effect. One possibility–rooted in the classic under-
standing if social ties as channels of private information–is that social proximity reduces the
saliency of status as an information device. The second possibility is that participants rely less
on status when they try to project an image of disinterestedness by not rewarding high-status
candidates with whom they have a history of collaboration. To understand whether there is
more in the interplay of status and ties than a compensative flow of information, in Study 3 we
manipulated the nature of the evaluative context. As in Study 2, we found that status reduces
the probability of bestowing an award on socially proximate candidates, but only when partici-
pants are induced to think that their decisions are public–i.e., they have to justify their evalua-
tion before other jury members. Conversely, when the evaluation is private, the negative effect
of status disappears. Since this result is obtained by keeping the audience-candidate social tie
constant across different conditions, it is plausible to conclude that reputational concerns–as
Table 6. Results for study 3.
Status No Status
Non Public (A) Public (B) Non Public (C) Public (D) Planned Contrasts
Award Propensity
M 4.42 4.25 4.44 4.58 B < D (p = .047)
A < C (n.s.)
N 95 108 102 92
https://doi.org/10.1371/journal.pone.0238651.t006
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opposed to inferential information–shape evaluators’ decisions [77]. While we can only specu-
late on the exact nature of this concern, the observation of differential effects across the public/
non-public conditions is strongly evocative of Goffman’s [78] “front stage”–“back stage” ten-
sion that may envelop audience members’ evaluative choices. When decisions are in the “front
stage,” the perception that evaluators are pursuing implicit personal gains rather than adhering
to disinterested rules and practices is likely to elicit efforts to project such disinterestedness
and hence deflect attention away from any signal that would render their choices overly sus-
ceptible to sceptical scrutiny. In our case, we speculate that insofar as social proximity height-
ens exposure to public criticism for the alleged pursuit of self-serving interests, audience-
candidate relationships that may be publicly perceived as structuring the awarding process
may also dampen the signalling saliency of status. The reason is not that the private informa-
tion channelled via a social relationship replaces the information conveyed by the candidate’s
status, but that such a relationship “influences how others perceive the actor” [39, p. 563],
thereby lowering the evaluator’s permeability to status cues. This presumption seems particu-
larly pertinent to ostensibly meritocratic cultural settings characterized by a strong vocational
drive and professional ethos [79], where the potential stigma stemming from the alleged trans-
gression of the meritocratic ideal may be particularly severe for one’s reputation. Future exper-
imental research more geared toward the analysis of the evaluators’ decision-making patterns
and other micro intervening processes underlying our effects is needed to probe the plausibil-
ity of this interpretation.
The findings of this study are important because they shift the emphasis away from either
status or social network explanations for recognition and refocus the attention on how these
two mechanisms combine in the creation of prestige hierarchies and how such a combinatory
effect may itself vary with the specific relational context in which the evaluative activity occurs.
Specifically, the negative interaction effect between status and social ties has interesting impli-
cations for the dynamics of cumulative advantage. The finding that marginal returns to status
diminish with social network proximity adds another piece of evidence that there might be
endogenous constraints on the Mathew effect [80]. It is often assumed that the self-reinforce-
ment of status and networks inevitably leads to “winner-take-all” dynamics as cumulative ben-
efits accrue mostly to those who, even by small margins, are in superior positions [81, 82]. This
assumption needs to be qualified especially if, under certain conditions, status considerations
may lose saliency in the eyes of audience members in charge of relinquishing material and
symbolic resources to competing candidates. Further research should elucidate which condi-
tions are worthy of future inquiry.
We believe that our paper takes an important step towards a more precise articulation, in
both theoretical and empirical terms, of the role of evaluating audiences in explaining status-
based recognition mechanisms. A better understanding of how audiences shape status dynam-
ics is important to mitigate the tension between achievement and ascription that is at the core
of meritocratic evaluative settings–whereby audiences are supposed to justify their delibera-
tions based on standards that can be articulated independently of available options [11]. In
addition, understanding how audience evaluations may change with the degree of scrutiny to
which they are amenable seems crucial in light of ever-increasing calls for transparency and
fairness in public life [19]. It is therefore worthwhile to probe the interaction between candi-
dates’ status and audience-candidate connectivity, particularly if one considers that social
proximity between producers and audience members is a constitutive feature of peer-based
evaluative settings. Because of the role-switch structure of these settings, audience members
are also members of the same community as the candidates they evaluate, even though they
take on different roles [83], and so–more often than not–they may have few degrees of separa-
tion from each other [22, 84].
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More generally, our findings speak to prior work attentive to the role of the social-relational
context in shaping assessments of merit. Ridgeway and Correll [85] consider a social-relational
context any situation in which an actor has to take into account the expected reactions of oth-
ers in determining how to act, because such reactions will have consequences for her interests.
Other lines of scholarship point to how personal preferences often seem to fade in salience rel-
ative to what is publicly endorsed in a status hierarchy [11, 12]. This phenomenon is especially
apparent in research on “politics of dissimulation”–e.g., Norbert Elias’ [86] scholarship on
authoritarian systems–whereby public displays of allegiance to the official credo may mask a
great deal of private disagreement. Findings in experimental economics also suggest that indi-
viduals tend to change their strategic choices depending on whether they are isolated or part of
a group, and on whether there is an audience observing their choices [20]. Likewise, research
on social evaluation [87], as well as studies on the social transmission of ideas of fairness [88,
89], show that the apparent social validity of something (e.g., social norms on pro-social behav-
iour) shapes individual decision-makers’ allocative choices, independent of their personal
assessments of quality or fairness. Our study adds conceptual and empirical nuance to these
lines of research by revealing how the influence of crucial social cues–such as status and ties–
on evaluators’ choices may depend on whether members of the evaluating audience can infer
key motivational premises from those choices. In light of recent findings revealing the condi-
tions under which social norms in collective decision-making settings may play a smaller role
than previously assumed [90, 91], the extent to which socio-normative pressures–as opposed
to an individual’s professional ethos, concern for her image or other behavioural mecha-
nisms–are indeed driving this interaction effect could be an exciting area for future inquiry.
To this end, we might posit a variety of peer-based evaluative contexts from those akin to our
setting, where individual choices are collectively socialized and visible to other decision-mak-
ers (e.g., Cannes Film Festival, National Science Foundation), to those where individual
choices remain private (e.g., Grammies, Academy Awards).
Several questions merit further attention. Our data do not capture the process by which
jury members collectively make their decisions, in particular how their (often) conflicting
opinions are reconciled and consensus on which projects to reward is reached. The combina-
tion of archival and interview data offered some suggestive insights, but the use of an ethno-
graphic approach would be better suited to gain a more nuanced understanding of the
processes by which reward allocation decisions are collectively made. One could then probe
more deeply the conditions under which the desire to distance oneself from morally dubious
evaluations is, in fact, driving those decisions, independently from the evaluator’s actual per-
sonal beliefs. Another issue is that prior project collaborations capture only a subset of relevant
audience-candidate interpersonal relationships. While we endeavoured to control for other
possible manifestations of these social intercourses, an extension could be to supplement proj-
ect collaboration data with additional data on more informal interactions (e.g., advice, friend-
ship, mentorship, and so on) and examine whether patterns of rewards allocation can then be
explained more accurately. Along this line, another interesting research direction would be to
compare and contrast the role of formal vis-à-vis informal ties in shaping evaluative outcomes
for different levels of status. These are but some of the many questions that future research
could explore in greater depth.
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